GLOBAL POLICY BRIEFING

Building a Collective EU Brand Identity

Pall Rafnar Thorsteinsson, Research Fellow Gold Mercury International

BRAND EU
European Union Brand Centre

500 million people. One Brand
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KEY POINTS
+ This global policy briefing sets out to explore the brand identity of the EU, with a view to both assessing its potency and to suggest ways to develop it and strengthen its appeal to European citizens.

+ It explores how political and brand identities are constructed, while identifying the key elements at the core of the EU identity as well as the main obstacles which prevent European Citizens from engaging with the EU.

+ The lack of a shared language and nationally focused media are presented as the main obstacles to the development of a robust, Europe-wide public sphere, where European citizens can engage in a constructive dialogue on EU policies and the future of the Union.

+ However, Europeans do share attachment to certain civic values, emphasizing democracy, equality, liberty, human rights and inclusiveness.

+ The European values constitute a cultural “export product” of a civilization, a brand identity of the EU in international affairs.

+ Globalisation brings to the fore the need for European solidarity and for a collective EU identity in order to secure competitiveness and European influence in international politics, while promoting the European Values.

+ Lastly, this global policy briefing makes a series of recommendations such as the need to involve the citizens in a constructive debate on European affairs at the “home front,” where growing populist Eurosceptic ideology must be confronted.

KEY WORDS
+ EU Identity, BRAND EU, globalisation, EU Citizens, political identity, brand identity, EU ideals, public opinion, democratic deficit, public sphere, European media, Common Foreign Security Policy, European Values, brand Europe, European Elections.
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BUILDING A COLLECTIVE EU BRAND IDENTITY

PREFACE
By Gold Mercury President
Nicolas De Santis

Our present world is complex, unstable and very fragile. At Gold Mercury, we believe that the EU is a necessity in order to create a more stable world. The European Union, which currently includes 28 member states, is a miracle of Global Governance in our complex world. But, as with all great things, we take most of its achievements for granted. But think about it for a moment...

THE EU - A GROWING FAMILY OF UNITED MINDS
For starters, the EU has maintained peace in Western Europe for 68 years since the Second World War. Following the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, most Eastern European countries joined the EU, including: Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and the Czech Republic.

The EU now also includes countries which went to war after the former Yugoslavia broke up in the 1990’s, such as Slovenia and Croatia. Soon it will include many more; with some countries on the road to joining and others which have already applied to join, such as Serbia, Kosovo*, Albania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Bosnia & Herzegovina, and Montenegro. Uniting Western and Eastern Europe and former Yugoslavian countries under one roof in modern times, is nothing short of a miracle.

All of these countries could have chosen a different path; going out on their own or joining others, but instead they chose to join and belong to the EU. This is because the EU stands for liberty, progress and modernity; representing peace, stability and strength in unity.

Non-EU nations believe in the EU and its key role as a world stabiliser.

They believe in this so much so, that even the U.S. White House and Japanese Government have come to its defence recently to remind EU nations how important the EU is for them and the world. This happened most recently when the UK Government proposed a future referendum on whether to remain in the EU or not. Obama stated that: “the United States values a strong UK in a strong European Union, which makes critical contributions to peace, prosperity, and security in Europe and around the world.” The Japanese embassy in London argued that a large portion of Japanese investment in the UK and other EU nations was for the purpose of access to the single market: “More than 1,300 Japanese companies have invested in the UK, as part of the single market of the EU, and have created 130,000 jobs, more than anywhere else in Europe. This fact demonstrates that the advantage of the UK as a gateway to the European market has attracted Japanese investment.”

THE EURO - MORE THAN A CURRENCY
Of the 28 EU nations, 17 share a single currency: the Euro. More nations will join the Euro soon, increasing its power and influence. The Euro has become a global currency, second only to the dollar. To deny this fact, or to imply that the Euro could disappear - is to confuse, misrepresent, and misinform. It is to lie.

Some said that the Euro would break up, or that Greece would leave the Euro to save itself. This has not happened, despite the fact that speculators and banking advisors to failing governments always propose this, as a quick option to regain monetary control and devalue their currency.

They propose this in the belief that cheapening a country's currency and controlling interest rates again could magically save failed economies.

Anyone can understand that in a globalised world, this is short-term thinking with many irreversible consequences. Imagine if the state of Texas seceded and left the Dollar behind; and then created its own currency, because the US economy was weak (which it currently is). There would be no more US Federal aid or investment. Without this now “foreign” investment, government funding would be accounted for via increased taxation. With these severed ties and the increased taxation, the high skilled tech workers, lawyers, doctors and filmmakers would most likely decide to relocate elsewhere, with the

* Kosovo: This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244/99 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

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resulting brain drain creating a vicious cycle of downturn in the new Texas economy. Trade relations with the US would also likely be severed, and in an economy where geographical proximity is the highest influencing factor on national trade, the new Texan currency would likely be worthless. Though an example extreme, it shows some of the potential chains of negative consequences and events which are associated with leaving such complex international organisations.

The Euro is not to blame for Europe’s financial problems, as these are derived from a self-inflicted global crisis, national government incompetence and lack of proper financial control governance mechanisms. The Euro is now one of the strongest currencies in the world beyond the Eurozone area. The Euro is the second most actively traded currency in foreign exchange markets; it is a counterpart in around 40% of the daily transactions which take place. Despite Europe’s financial crisis, new countries like Latvia have chosen to join the Euro rather than keep their own currency. This is not seen as a loss of sovereignty for Latvia; that would be short-term thinking; but is instead seen as a gain in access to a global market and a Union of shared interests and values.

The Euro, like other currencies, will be strong one day and weaker on another day, but will always remain a strong symbol of unity and progress nonetheless. In today’s financial circumstances, we need less global speculation and more stable global currencies. The Euro is a representative of this important ideal.

WHY A BRAND EU - EUROPEAN UNION BRAND CENTRE?
The EU, like other international organisations, or national governments, is not perfect; and it never will be. But we at Gold Mercury believe that a strong European Union has provided, and will continue to provide, an incredible global public good of peace and great stability for us all in an increasingly unstable world.

The EU is a success story in global governance, but the BRAND EU is not well managed, understood or communicated. It is a great product but presently - very difficult to understand and poorly communicated. This lack of ‘brand management’ reduces citizen support and puts the entire purpose of the EU at risk: allowing anti-EU forces to attack it, without much sign of a defence. We aim to change this by providing an independent communications and EU brand policy programme to debate the EU. Gold Mercury wants to guarantee that the people of Europe, and beyond, understand the BRAND EU, and understand the universal values which its member states have chosen to represent and defend. Values like liberty, democracy, solidarity, human rights and the rule of law. These are the values that the EU exports to the world; the values that all global citizens of goodwill aspire to. The EU’s values are universal and global. The BRAND EU is therefore a global brand and a guarantor of these values.

ROLE OF THE BRAND EU - EUROPEAN UNION BRAND CENTRE
With the above in mind, the role of the BRAND EU Centre includes the following areas:
1/ Clarify the current state of European Union brand identity and clarify its vision in the world.
2 / Assist in the strategic positioning and promotion of the BRAND EU as a leading global brand of unity within the EU and in the world.
3/ Clarify how the EU works and improve EU communications and understanding.
4/ Shed light on the myths surrounding the EU and provide a neutral ground for EU debate.
5/ Monitor the EU Brand and report on its progress.

The EU recently won the 2012 Nobel Peace Prize for advancing peace, democracy and human rights in modern times. We believe that if we are able to clearly communicate what the EU really is and what it stands for in the world, all Europeans (and non-Europeans) will increase their support and involvement in the European project.

Please join us in this endeavour.

Nicolas De Santis
President of Gold Mercury International
FOREWORD
By Enrique Baron Crespo, Former President of the European Parliament

Let me begin with the sound advice of Seneca: “the life of those that forget the past, neglect the present and fear the future is very brief and painful”.

In the current European situation, it means that we must not underestimate the importance of a united Europe or of the European elections of 2014. The risk of neglect, increasing voter abstention or fearing the rise of populisms, can be a chance to create a new decisive momentum to overcome the crisis and reinforce the European Project.

We must not forget the past. The elections will take place in the centennial of the suicide that Europe committed with the beginning in 1914 of the Great War that concluded in 1945. Nearly a hundred million victims all over the world.

Since then, we have lived the longest period of peace in our common history, thanks to the construction of a United Europe, built on the principles and values of parliamentarian democracy, the system most despised by all the dictatorships that Europe suffered in the 20th Century. The awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012 is the recognition of this achievement. Let us not forget the past.

Let us also not neglect the present, or fear the future. The work of the BRAND EU Centre is vitally important for creating this new decisive momentum, and overcoming our adversities – to generate a more stable, secure and even further united Europe. A stronger union, a louder voice, and a tougher brand are all needed to move the Union forward into the future with its head held high – the BRAND EU Centre aims to facilitate development of these three crucial areas.

By strengthening the European Brand through a diverse range of engagements and campaigns, our aim is to show everyone; be they a Eurosceptic, an abstaining voter, or a popular politician, that a stronger union is absolutely the way forward, for all of us. At this critical juncture where the future of European peace and cooperation is at stake, the work of the BRAND EU Centre has never been more important. Our aim is to strengthen the common European identity built around values of democracy, liberty, peace and modernity. In doing so, we hope that we can make the future of Europe more secure and stable; something quite rare in these troubling times.
Identifying why EU citizens do not have a shared sense of belonging across the EU

ABSTRACT
This policy briefing sets out to explore the brand identity of the EU, with a view to both assessing its potency and to suggest ways to develop it and strengthen its appeal to European citizens. A sense of shared identity is an important factor in establishing a felt legitimacy of political authority. Broadly speaking, Europeans do share attachment to certain civic values: emphasizing democracy, equality, liberty, human rights and inclusiveness. But there are challenges on the horizon. The current economic crisis tests the cohesion of diverse nations and, as the response to this crisis will require further political integration, the question of democratic accountability becomes ever more urgent. The lack of a shared language and nationally focused media, present obstacles to the development of a robust Europe-wide public sphere; where European citizens can engage in a constructive dialogue on EU policies and the future of the Union.

However, since EU affairs have become a salient, if marginalized, part of domestic politics in EU member-states, there is an opportunity and need to involve the citizens in a constructive debate on European affairs on the “home front,” where growing populist Eurosceptic ideology must be confronted. Mainstream political leaders have a responsibility to take the initiative in this debate. Lastly, globalisation brings to the fore the need for European solidarity in order to secure competiveness and European influence in international politics. But the international dimension also reveals the distinctiveness and relevance of the political and moral values, enshrined in the shared civic identity of European citizens. The European values constitute a cultural “export product” of a civilization, a brand identity in international affairs. Thus, an awareness of Europe’s role on the global stages should further corroborate and encourage identification with the European project among the citizens of Europe.
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Do Europeans identify themselves as such, as Europeans? This question is important for many reasons. For one, identity engenders cohesiveness and promotes allegiance to institutions and policies. Thus, it has consistently been shown that a strong sense of European identity has significant positive implications for an individual's support for EU policies and furthers European integration [Herrmann & Brewer 2004; Fligstein 2008; Risse 2010]. Further progress within the EU will therefore, to a large extent, depend on whether national populations develop a greater sense of shared identity between them. At a moment in time when Europe is sailing through rough waters; confronting its deepest economic crisis in decades; facing a surge in popularity of Eurosceptic political parties in member states, and even witnessing the head of government of a major member state entertaining the possibility of divorcing the EU for good, the issue of how to win the hearts and minds of European citizens becomes imperative.

A recent survey by the Pew Research Center reveals, quite unambiguously, that popular support for the EU is taking a beating, dropping from 60% in 2012 to a mere 45% in 2013. What is more worrying still, is that support levels are falling across social groups, including young citizens, who traditionally regard the EU in a more positive light [PRC 2013].

So, current circumstances present a great challenge to the reinforcement of cohesion among the citizens of Europe. But beyond the immediate temporal frame, there awaits an entrenched obstacle to the endeavor of forging a Europe-wide identity.

Proposals to that effect, are liable to cause worries that a corresponding dilution of the sense for national identity is inevitable. Thus, they will meet resistance: both conscious and unconscious. Eurosceptic politicians tap into these worries as is apparent from their consistent national-identity rhetoric.

In what follows, this policy briefing will discuss the notion of European Identity from three different angles. First it will try to cast a light on the notion in general terms, looking very briefly at the concept of social identity as such, before mapping out the content of European identity in particular and asking to what extent it is compatible with a proud sense of nationality. It will then be argued that although not fixed or uncontested, European identity is far from being a vacuous concept. On the contrary, EU institutions actively promote a conception of European identity that revolves around certain core values, such as: liberty, diversity, social equality, democracy and the rule of law. This is a civic conception of European identity based on ideas that originate and have deep roots in European thought and culture. In modern times these values have acquired a nearly universal allegiance. Indeed it may be said that they have become a political (or cultural or moral) export product that represents Europe.

They constitute the “brand” Europe. Moreover, it will be shown that there is in fact no contradiction between supra-national identification and a strong sense of belonging to national or local communities. On the contrary; they can work together.

Thereupon, this policy briefing will explore the relation between the identity formation and democratic processes. The institutional methods that the EU has relied on, from the outset and up until now, in order to foster cohesion among European citizens will be critically discussed. The strategy adhered to by the “founding fathers,” described below in terms of neofunctionalism, was premised on the supposition that institutionalization of economic integration in Europe, would give rise to a class of professionals, who would take direct part in cooperative functional projects.

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These professionals were expected to assume a shared identity based on the ideology of their shared activities. This sense of belongingness was then expected to gradually “spill over” into wider sections of society and, in time, engender shared sense of Europeanness [Haas 1964]. It will be shown below that this approach has its limitations. In particular, while focusing on economic processes, it fails to account for public participation in political processes and, therefore, arguably leads to a lack of democratic legitimacy.

In addition, an alternative vision, based on the idea of a Europe-wide public sphere, where citizens debate and decide upon policy issues through a rational and democratic process, will be assessed. It will transpire that there are, indeed, many obstacles toward the development of a truly trans-European public sphere capable of sustaining robust political debate and democratic processes across the continent. Europeans, for example, do not share a language, nor has there been developed a European media culture, given that media are predominantly focused on national interests. Furthermore, European affairs tend to be marginalized in national politics (even though they have become a central factor in political, economic and social practices in all EU member-states). Therefore, it will be argued that it seems more promising to address the problem referred to as the democratic deficit at the home front, where the European project confronts the Euro-skeptic critique. In other words, the emerging “Europeanized” public spheres in EU member-states should be the fora, where European affairs are made relevant and allowed to attain a psychological presence through political debate.

European Cooperation and Integration can serve as a model of international relations.

Lastly, the notion of European identity will be discussed in the context of international affairs, and Europe’s role in the global stage will be explored. The growing competition from rising economic powers poses a great challenge to European economies, and questions arise regarding how to pool the sovereignty of autonomous nations, in order to meet this challenge. In addition, the idea of what shape Europe wants to give to the international community, what it can contribute to world affairs and the relation to the sense of European identity enshrined in the treaties, practices and history of Europe will be examined.

It will be argued in this chapter that globalization provides compelling incentives for European nations to form a unified front and to speak with one voice in order to protect their interests and promote their moral outlook. More importantly, this chapter suggests that European cooperation and integration can serve as a model of international relations. The EU’s foreign policy, and the outward identity it reflects, mirrors the conception of European identity that is promoted among EU citizens. It is based upon values such as the rule of international law, multilateralism, democracy and human rights. Europe’s “brand identity” conveys the ideas of enlightenment, modernity and cooperation. One aspect of Europe’s purpose may be viewed in the promotion of these values in world affairs.

Lastly, this policy briefing recommends that the EU should encourage cross-border communications, as well as scholarly and professional exchange programmes. It urges pro-European political leaders not to shy away from debating the future of Europe in their domestic political spheres, even though the current economic troubles render such debate difficult and politically inconvenient. It is more urgent than ever that public debate about European affairs be informed and led with responsibility. Lastly, European leaders are advised to make the most of the power of cooperation on the international stage and speak with a unified voice in order to promote European values and interests.
INTRODUCTION
This policy briefing is a study of the idea of a European identity. In broad outline, the notion of identity will be viewed from an “introspective” point of view and an “outward-looking one.” The first concerns the way in which citizens of different European nations come to identify with one another and foster a shared sense of belongingness. Indeed, one might ask whether and to what extent such sharing is feasible at all. This involves both the content of shared identity, i.e. the principles, ideals and practices of which it consists, as well as modes of reaffirming and reshaping it, how it is communicated between generations and, most importantly, between citizens through public participation. The second aspect concerns the socio-political whole, in this instance the European Union, and particularly how it expresses its common identity to the outside world of nations on the international stage. Whether there is congruence and continuity between these two perspectives is a matter of importance.

It may also be convenient to refer to this approach as internal and external branding respectively. On the one hand, there is the task of appealing to citizens and win their endorsement of policies, based on a political system that represents certain values. On the other hand, there is the task of gaining influence in international politics and of disseminating these values globally.

The “internal” aspect will be discussed in chapters 1 and 2, as presented below. First, light will be cast on the prevalence and content of European identity. Thereupon the development of European identity will be examined in its political context and with regard to the future of European wide democracy. Lastly, the idea will be discussed in the context of globalization and international cooperation/competition. The study is based on scholarly literature, statistics and reports issued by EU institutions and other research centers, and it is informed by conversations with prominent contributors to the European project.
1. The idea of Europe and the case for a European identity

The idea of the nation state is a relatively young one in human history, dating back to the 18th century. In order to muster support for the institutions of this new form of government, narratives of a shared separate culture and historical national identities were constructed. Thus the “myth” of the nation – those imagined communities – was born [Anderson 1991]. The sense of belongingness to a nation is a potent psychological force that has been misused with terrible consequences in recent history. Notoriously, men and women have been wiling to make the ultimate sacrifice for the fatherland. “But who would die now for Europe?” famously asks Anthony Smith; an adamant skeptic about the existence of a European identity. [Smith 1991: 160-161].

In comparison, a pan-European identity would seem tenuous. A study of European identity and the way Europe as a whole presents itself in the world, must confront the question of how such an identity may be constructed, maintained and managed in face of competing and entrenched national identities. Is there an inherent contradiction between such identifications or are they compatible? Further, does European identity need to have all the attributes and the same motivational force as the traditional sense of national belongingness? Or, could it be that the European project, with its deep philosophical roots, may inform a new sort of civic identity to suit governance in a new age?

Although the EU has an official European flag (with twelve stars), a European anthem (Ode to Joy from Beethoven’s 9th symphony), a currency (the Euro) and even Europe Day (9th of May), these symbols have failed to truly engage with citizens of Europe as their content and meaning are unclear.
1.1 The notion of identity

Political identity is one form of social identity, and the same goes for national and supra-national identities. Social identity is broadly used to describe a psychological link between an individual and the social groups or communities to which an individual belongs. Sociologists have long recognized that identities are shaped to a considerable extent by social structures, institutions and authority relations [e.g. Jenkins 2008]. One particularly prominent definition of social identity describes it as “that part of the individual’s self-conception which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance attached to that membership” [Tajfel 1981, p. 255].

The question of European supranational identity has been prominently adherent to debates around the European Union for some time. A Declaration of European Identity was signed in Copenhagen in 1973, stating the goal of building support for the “principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice … and of respect for human rights” [Declaration of European Identity 1973: 2]. The EU has adopted various symbols and policies that facilitate such identification: the European flag, the anthem and Europe Day. With the Maastricht treaty, the notion of European citizenship was initiated and at the turn of the century the Euro became a reality. In 2001, the European Commission issued a white paper on European governance, where it stressed importance of reinforcing “European identity and the importance of shared values in the Union” [Commission of the European Communities 2001]. And nowadays, the year 2013 has been nominated the European Year of the Citizen by the European Union [http://europa.eu/citizens-2013/], where the process of enforcing the EU identity is centrally situated at the discourse.

Ms Ylva Tiveus, the Director of the European Commission’s Directorate for Citizens, expresses the importance of a shared identity succinctly:

“To build Europe we need Europeans. We need people to have a feeling for the underlying reasons why we created the EU in the first place, but also to have a shared vision of a common destiny, so to speak, and to acknowledge that we create Europe together.”

The introduction of the common currency, the medium of all media in peoples’ practical affairs, had an immediate impact on the psychological presence of the Euro-
European Union, with a corresponding sense of European identification among the peoples using the Euro in their daily life [Risse 2003]. Today it evokes feelings of distrust and resentment, both from the part of nations bearing the cost of financial bailouts as well as from those receiving support on condition of severe fiscal austerity measures. Such sentiments clearly affect solidarity and cohesion across Europe. Thus, according to Mr Urmas Paet, current Foreign minister of Estonia, “the biggest risk that we face now is that feelings caused by the economic crisis spill into other spheres. And it is the duty of the European leadership to prevent this from happening. There is too much at stake to shy away from that duty.” As the aforementioned survey by the Pew Research Center reveals quite clearly, these fears are substantiated.

It does for example indicate that old-line stereotypes are regaining their foothold in European consciousness. Thus the ideas of the unreliable southerners and the inflexible, stingy Germans surface once again. The acuteness of this problem cannot be overstressed – although it lies outside the limits of this study. Just as credit markets are based upon trust (after all “credit” derives from the Latin word for trust), so is a polity premised on civil trust. A sense of common identity, with the ideas of shared history, fate, and belongingness, in turn, is pivotal to the building up of civic trust.

1.2 Political Identities and Brand Identities

However, identities are fragile. Evidence shows that the sense of European identity is highly sensitive to media coverage. Consistent exposure to negative news stories about the EU has a direct effect on the way and extent to which people identify with their fellow European citizens, and the European Union as a political system [Bruter 2003; Bruter 2005]. In this regard, one should not expect a political system to be fundamentally different from consumer brands. Similar worries must plague the CEO and the Prime Minister, when their respective products receive bad publicity. To be sure, the consumer usually has the choice of alternative brands, whereas a citizen cannot simply opt-out of his or her political community. But under democratic rule, there is always the possibility of a regime change.

In reality, the very notion of identity is a complicated one and has been debated by philosophers and scholars for millennia. An identity is essential to any brand, be it a commercial one, political or organizational in a wider sense. It represents what the brand stands for, how it differentiates itself from other brands, and what makes it unique and valuable. An identity is at the same time a statement and a promise. The central and enduring attributes of identity are those that are “manifested as an organization’s core programmes, policies and procedures, and that reflect its highest values. Attributes that have passed the test of time or on some other basis operate as ‘irreversable’ commitments.” [Whetten, 2006, p. 222]

It is true that, to the extent that the above definition portraits identity as a timeless essence, it is based upon a contested philosophy. Nevertheless, it is revealing and quite suitable for our purpose, in that it brings to the fore the fundamental idea of an enduring core of values that render a project meaningful, provide it with direction and proposes a reason for participation and allegiance. An identity can be influenced by institutions and authority relations. In turn, perception of group membership can lead to conformity and acceptance of group norms and behavior [e.g. Jenkins 2008]. A social identity may be defined as a person’s knowledge that he/she...
belongs to a particular social group that provides him/her with a sense of emotional and value significance.

Very few would suggest that an identity constitutes a timeless, unchanging essence. What is important, is that there be certain salient defining features that may be endorsed and reinforced through engagement with the brand.

1.3 Is there any such thing as a European Identity?

Does there, then, exist a special European identity that encompasses all that is essentially European and sets it apart from what is not? Does the European project have an identifiable source and does it have a clear direction?

The bare suggestion that there is such an identity has been questioned [e.g. Brubaker & Cooper 2000]. And even among those who accept its existence, there are those that describe it as “indeterminate,” or even “vacuous”. [Breakwell, 2004].

On the face of it, there is no lack of misgivings as to whether there is such a thing as a European Identity. For one thing, Europe’s geographical boundaries are not clear cut and do not therefore pose a special distinction between Europe and the “other.” In fact, Europe’s borders are clearly and purposefully left undefined in the EU treaties [Article 49, TEU]. Several European nations are not members of the EU. The Council of Europe (not to be confused with the EU’s Council of Ministers or the European Council, which encompasses the heads of state of EU member-states) has 47 member-states, but only 28 of them are part of the EU. Moreover the EU itself is divided in some respects. The euro-zone, for example, includes 18 out of 28 EU member states, whereas the Schengen area of passport control includes Iceland, Norway and Switzerland (all non EU-members) but excludes the UK, Ireland and more EU countries – thus blurring the symbolic potency of the EU passport and EU citizenship. Europe’s boundaries are therefore fuzzy both in definition and in practice.

Unity in diversity

In a quite different sense, boundaries were drawn in the prelude to the 2003 invasion into Iraq, dividing Europe ideologically in two, between the old Europe (namely the nations that opposed a preemptive military intervention) and the new Europe (the states which supported the invasion, many of whom were soon to be EU member states and new members of NATO).

This schism, though based on actual disagreement among European nations on a serious matter of international politics, was primarily painted by external actors – namely the US Bush administration. In a plea for European solidarity, two eminent philosophers, Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida, responded to this rhetoric by coining the idea of “core Europe”, thus reclaiming the initiative of identity construction [Habermas & Derrida 2005]. One lesson to be drawn from this episode, surely, is the importance of being in control of one’s identity and not have it imposed from the outside.

Moreover, and more importantly, Europe is after all the birthplace of nationalism. No more than 150 years ago Europeans actively endeavored to pull apart from each other, to elicit the differences between them and actually divided themselves into separate nation states, based on the idea of distinct peoples with their own histories and culture. No single language is shared among Europeans, and even though Christianity dominated Europe for centuries, modern Europe is comprised of a substantial number of religious minorities.

Europe has been described as a collection of ethnicities and in comparison with the national cultures and ethnic traditions, “European Identity” may seem “vacuous and nondescript, a rather lifeless summations of all the peoples and cultures on the continent, adding little to what already exists” [Smith 1995, 131]. Therefore, it can be claimed that the continent seems fragmented rather than united. In that sense, it is easy to conclude that the idea of a culturally unified Europe and a European identity is a mere
myth. Indeed, as early as 1828, distinguished historian, François Guizot, drew attention to this remarkable cultural diversity.

Yet, paradoxically, he saw in it an underlying similarity: “Modern Europe presents us with examples of all systems, of all experiments of social organization; pure or mixed monarchies, theocracies, republics, more or less aristocratic, have thus thrived simultaneously, one beside the other; and, notwithstanding their diversity, they have all a certain resemblance, a certain family likeness, which it is impossible to mistake.” [François Guizot, History of Civilizations in Europe – quoted in Kumar 2003]

This very mosaic is in fact enshrined in the principle “Unity in Diversity”, in accordance with which the European Union endeavors to promote the diversity of its cultures, while at the same time “bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore” [Article 151 TEC]. The EU is founded upon “the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law” [Article 6 TEU]. Furthermore, the Berlin Declaration (adopted on the eve of the EU’s 50th anniversary in 2007), emphasizes the common ideals of individual liberty, human dignity, equality of men and women, peace, freedom, tolerance and solidarity.

They are moral ideals of great importance and should be the source of great pride. Very importantly the EU has been ready to sanction member-states that transgress these principles.

These ideals are not simply pulled down from the ether as so many pretty catch phrases. They do in fact have very deep roots in European culture and philosophical tradition. Thus Democracy originated in Greece, later to be developed in early modern and modern Europe. The same applies to the ideal of the Rule of Law. The international human rights discourse is firmly grounded in the quintessentially European idea of individual autonomy [cf Schneewind 1997]. And, again, liberalism and tolerance grew out of the reformation and the religious wars. This is not to say that these ideals constitute some primordial essence or the true nature of Europeans. They are, indeed, thin and abstract. But they are moral ideals of great importance and should be the source of great pride. Very importantly the EU has been ready to sanction member-states that transgress these principles, as was the case with Jörg Haider’s government in Austria in 2006 (EurActiv 13/02/06).

1.4 EU Ideals as Cultural Exports

Only in modern times have these ideals attained global reach and appeal, as they were cultural exports of Europe, indeed a global brand. These are abstract ideals, lacking the thickness of local traditions to be sure. But they are defining features of an intellectual culture that spreads over the whole of Europe, they are the products of the European journey; the culmination of the Enlightenment project.

To the above we must add commitment to free market economy and the welfare state. The former is that sphere in which European integration is furthest along and it has undoubtedly been one of the main driving forces of European prosperity in recent history. Indeed, there are many who want the EU project to be confined to such economic cooperation. The latter, by contrast, is a field in which EU member states have been reluctant to pass their powers over to Brussels, and moves in that direction would in all likelihood be fiercely opposed by European peoples. But redistribution of resources requires a “strong sense of solidarity” [Habermas 2006, p. 76, see also e.g. Sandel 1998, ch. 2], and possibly a greater sense of identification that Europe can aspire to in the near future, since national identity outweighs European identity in Europe generally and in all member states (cf. Eurobarometer 78, 2012; see also table 1 below).

It is moreover, highly significant that those groups which are least prone to identify with Europe and support the European project are precisely those groups that are most vulnerable to the negative effects of economic globalization and most dependent on the welfare state: people
with little education, lower income, as well as the elderly [e.g. Fligstein 124, 146, 207].

There is therefore a notion of European identity, officially expressed, revolving around certain political and moral values. In light of the discussion above, we should regard Europeanness, not so much in terms of geographical definitions, but rather in terms of a set of goals, values and behavior, which are considered appropriate and beneficial for European states and peoples.

1.5 The competing conceptions of identity

It should be noted, however, that there are alternatives to this conception of the content of European identity. Identities are contested and fiercely fought over; particularly so in times of crises, as in the case of the split into old and new Europe referred to above. The conception elicited in this chapter is the self-image, which the EU consciously projects, endorsed by the political elites in Brussels. It embraces modern liberal secularism, democratic and humanistic values against nationalism and militarism. On the other hand, there are conceptions that highlight the continent’s Christian heritage and regard European culture as a distinct civilization [e.g. Risse 2010]. The latter: the traditionalist or anti-modern approach, encompasses a spectrum, to the far extreme of which we find nationalist, xenophobic racism. In this context, commentators often speak of the so-called “fortress Europe” mentality, a strong opposition to liberal multiculturalism and immigration (whether non-Europeans coming to Europe or Europeans migrating from poorer parts of the continent to more affluent parts in search for employment and a better life). The anti-modern conception of European identity need not necessarily be outright anti-EU. It may accommodate the instrumentalist argument that the economics of scale, realized through European commercial cooperation, are required precisely in order to defend a certain conception of a traditional European culture. However, this exclusionary ideology contradicts the civil conception of Europe projected by European institutions and is fiercely defiant of further political integration.

And, furthermore, it provides fertile soil for Eurosceptic political parties that are gaining ground across Europe [Hooghe & Marks 2007]. These views resonate with the 40 per cent of Europeans, who identify solely with their own nation [e.g. Fligstein 2008; cf. table 1 to the left] and are therefore a potential obstacle to European identity building.

1.6 Do ideals reflect public opinion?

The ideals enumerated above are all abstract notions. And yet surveys reveal that individual European citizens do associate them with the EU. Thus, when faced with the question of what the European Union represents for them, most people (42%) name freedom of movement (to work or study), according to the Eurobarometer [EB 2012]. Peace is in fourth place (26%), democracy and cultural diversity in sixth and seventh (19%). Results are similar for the EU’s primary achievements: freedom of movement and peace are among the member states top the list (with around 50%).

Surveys seem to show a stable sense of European citizenship as well. According to the 2012 (autumn) Eurobarometer survey, 63% of Europeans say that they feel they are European citizens. However, only 22% respond with certainty; 41% feel European to some extent, while 23% do not think of themselves as European citizens, and a further 13% definitely do not do so [EB 2012].

Table 1. Source: Eurobarometer 91, Spring 2004 (cf. Fligstein 2008, 141).
Furthermore, a great deal depends upon the phrasing of questions and expression of allegiance or a sense of “belongingness” may vary according to the alternatives the respondent is presented with. Thus, table 1 above shows people’s connection to Europe relative to their own nation. Most people, or 87.3% of respondents, identify themselves primarily with their nationality, and 44% identify solely with their nationality.

The majority of respondents, do, to some extent, identify with Europe. And some 13% identify primarily with Europe. From this data we may infer, importantly, that national identity does not exclude a sense of European identity. Social identities are indeed compatible and mix in a variety of ways. Political identities, of course, require a very special and strong allegiance. They involve corresponding and well defined benefits, rights and duties that are enforceable by law. Therefore, it might be expected that the national and the supra-national identities would clash. But this is a false dichotomy. The studies clearly show that there is no contradiction between identification with Europe and a strong sense of national identity. [e.g. Risse 2010; Fligstein 2008; Bruter 2005; Herrmann & Brewer 2004].

Moreover, a tendency to support the European project and its further integration does not depend upon giving priority to the supra-national identity over national identity. A secondary identification with Europe, that is, some genuine feeling of shared identity, although the individual may primarily identify with his or her nation (own nationality and European in table 1), is quite sufficient to greatly increase support for EU policies and institutions.

And this is very significant indeed, for what it means first, is that the proponents of European integration need not take on the Herculean task of reducing (let alone obliterating) national allegiance and forging a new identity of a “European nation”, with all the strong emotional attachments required. Some sense of genuine belongingness is quite sufficient in order to promote the European project. Secondly, it is important to recognize the practical aim of spreading a sense of European identity, which in no way contradicts the content of this very identity – i.e. the civil conception of European identity based on a liberal celebration diversity. This somewhat limited form of European identity, sometimes dubbed “European identity light” [Risse 2010], would seem to be very feasible focal point of a strategic vision aiming at fostering European identity and increasing confidence in the European Union.

The number of people in Europe with a sense of European Identity will reach 69% in 2030.

In this regard, one should note that studies have shown that those who identify strongly with Europe, as opposed to more local cultures, are typically those who, through business or studies, have interacted with colleagues and peers in other countries. They are the well-off and well educated, belonging to a professional-elite class. People with highly marketable skills, who are likely to speak a second European language.
These are precisely the people who have benefited most from European integration. One can hardly expect this class of strongly committed Europeans will grow substantially in the near future. But it should be reemphasized, that people who do as a matter of fact ever think of themselves as Europeans are very likely to have positive attitudes toward the EU, regardless of social class variables [Fligstein 2008 pp. 147].

Furthermore, the data shows that identification with Europe and support for the European project is directly linked to (and not just a felt share in) the visible benefits of European integration but, more importantly, to European exposure. That is to say, the more people have engaged with their colleagues and peers from other European countries, the more they are inclined to perceive themselves as Europeans and not just as nationals of their own country. Finding ways to spreading this feeling of belongingness more widely among social classes is therefore very important.

Arguably, time works in favour of the development of European identity as new generations appear, who receive more exposure to Europe than previous generations did. The EU’s policy on higher education and student exchanges is very conducive to this end. It has thus been calculated that the number of people in Europe with a sense of European identity will reach 69% in 2030 [cf. Fligstein 2008, p. 141 with references].

Yet, on most accounts, support for the EU at a public level is relatively low and superficial, and the same goes for identification with it. And there are those who argue that for any real sense of shared interests to emerge, the citizens must engage more actively with the processes of policy making in the EU [Warleigh 2003, p. 13 with references]. This is, in effect, a call for further democratic participation. However, many believe that a transnational organization like the EU, simply does not have the required cultural and ethnic basis to establish the democratic legitimacy it needs, given that democracy can only thrive with the close cohesion of the nation-state [Warleigh 2003, p. 26 with references]. On a milder form of this view, one might say that, although conceivable, European civic identity is highly unlikely to materialize, because national identities will resist being subsumed under a comprehensive European one. This chapter has highlighted statistics that show that the perceived clash between national and trans-national identities is based on a false dichotomy. But it remains to be seen whether the EU is sufficiently democratic to sustain further development of the emerging European identity that has been described above and whether its democratic credentials may be strengthened. There is the predicament that the EU’s powers and partial autonomy requires that its governance should be accountable and transparent. The next chapter seeks to address this issue.
2. A European Public Sphere

2.1 The problem of democratic deficit

It is by now, a fairly standard practice among both scholars and commentators to attribute a democratic deficit to the European Union, implying that the Union’s democratic credentials are inadequate. The citizens have a very narrow access to decision making processes and the EU’s institutions are perceived as distant and technocratic. One might well argue that a democratic deficit is a necessary evil for that kind of supra-national political identity. Not just because of the pragmatic concerns about efficiency in policy making and implementation. Rather, one of the primary reasons behind this view is precisely the belief that a European “state” can never encompass a civil community with the sort of shared identity that is required to justify the states’ sovereignty to its citizens.

It may be true, from an empirical standpoint, that the “European integration has never been democratic” [Warleigh 2003, p. 1] in a meaningful sense. Its origin was based in the hope and determination to maintain peace and the means to that goal was: from the onset and for decades to come; closer industrial and economics cooperation. The measures taken primarily required technocratic solutions. Involvement of the public was quite simply, not needed and would not have been expedient [Monnet 1978]. The development of the EU has always been a matter for governments.

The political establishment in Europe has been aware of this unease and its implications for a long time. Thus Mr Uffe Elleman-Jensen, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark, claims that the idea of decentralization had been seriously considered in the EU: “During the build up to Maastricht we discussed how we could strengthen a subsidiarity principle - so that decisions would, as a rule, be taken as close as possible to the people concerned. This might be an avenue to deal with the problem.” However, the current economic climate is calling for further centralization in certain areas, such as fiscal and monetary policy. Thus, the predicament is as acute as ever and the need for a strategic vision on how to dissolve it is urgent.
The lack of participation of the European Demos in decision making

The European Union derives its legitimacy, not from endorsement by the citizens, but from the governments of member states. And while this arrangement is not in outright opposition to democratic principles, insofar as the member states are democratically governed, the “European demos” has an indirect and very limited say on how are policies developed within the Union. This scenario may not have been problematic, if the impact of European integration on the European citizen was equally indirect. But in recent years, EU policies have become much broader in scope and have ever greater effect on the average individual, whereas the part played by the citizen in policy formation has not increased accordingly. Therefore, the citizen is situated on the periphery of the decision making process.

An apt way to describe this situation is to put it in terms of incongruence between where policy is made (i.e. in Brussels) and where politics is played (i.e. domestically) [Risse 2010]. Such incongruence begets a number of problems. There is the obvious distance between policy makers and those affected by policies. There is lack of transparency and accountability. There is, moreover, the constant possibility that European affairs become the victim of domestic political tactics. The EU is easily evoked as an alien foe by populists and governments may be tempted to describe unpopular measures as imposed by the Union, a game referred to as “blame shifting.” Studies have revealed that there is a definite tendency among national political leaders to blame unpopular decisions on the EU bureaucracy in Brussels, while taking credit for popular policies, even when they are in actual fact conceived, developed and passed by EU institutions [cf. Risse 2010, p. 247 with references].

But perhaps the most detrimental effect which this incongruence between policy making and politics has on a sound democratic culture is that it blurs the citizens’ awareness of the purposes and principles behind policies. Public debate does not take place, and people are only enabled to form their opinions to a very limited degree on the direction of the polity that governs a considerable part of their lives. To this extent, the democratic legitimacy of EU institutions is weak, and yet they have wide powers to enact law and enforce policy.

Therefore, Europe comes to be perceived as a pet project of a political elite, managed by bureaucrats, who are far removed from the concerns of real people. The whole edifice appears to lack accountability. And this democratic deficit, or incongruence, is very acutely felt by the European public. Only 44% of Europeans express satisfaction with the way democracy works in the EU, according to recent Eurobarometer surveys [EB 2012]. In comparison 49% on average are satisfied with democracy in their home countries. More importantly, 64% of Europeans believe that their vote does not count in the EU [EB 2012]. That is to say, two thirds of voters in European elections feel they are powerless when it comes to shaping EU regulations and the future of European cooperation. A clear majority of voters, however, believes on the domestic front that their vote counts, whereas in the European context only 31% do [EB 2012].

The European Parliament [EP], the EU’s sole claim to being directly democratically controlled and accountable, was initially a purely advisory body. Its powers have increased in successive steps with the Single European Act, and with the Maastricht and the Lisbon treaties (signed in 1986, 1992 and 2007 respectively).

VOTER TURNOUT IN EP ELECTIONS

Source: Society at a Glance 2001: OECD Social Indicators
(http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/sites/soc_glance-2011-en/08/04/g8_co4-01.html?contentType=&itemId=/content/chapter/soc_glance-2011-29-en&containerItemId=/content/serial/19991290&accessItemId=/content/book/soc_glance-2011-en&mimeType=text/html)

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It now has a qualified legislative role of co-decision, it has the ability to amend and veto legislation, and to initiate a legislative processes by requiring the European Commission to propose action on certain issues. Nevertheless, European voters are disinclined to regard the EP as a tool of democratic empowerment.

Voter turnout in EP elections has declined steadily over the last three decades. It was about 62% in 1979 but reached a new record low in 2009, when only 43% of EU voters bothered to cast their vote. Although voter apathy is a general trend among developed nations, this development must be of great concern in light of the above statistics. In comparison the OECD average voter turnout rate is 70%.

Arguably the time is not quite ripe for a European identity to take shape or for pan-European politics to materialize [cf. Fligstein 2008]. After all the EU has existed for merely half a century and the real political integration has just begun.

2.2 Neo-functionalist heritage

But how, then, can Europe respond to the “legitimation crisis” it is faced with? Providing an adequate answer to this question becomes increasingly important at the moment, when the EU is struggling through an unprecedented economic crisis, the solution to which will inevitably require deeper economic and political integration or disintegration and separation.

Granting that a sense of belongingness facilitates support for the EU project and further integration, we must explore how such a belongingness can be nurtured and promoted, and to what extent this may be achieved without presupposing the very integration that requires endorsement. It is argued that institutional changes cannot be effectuated without such a sense of belongingness, a shared identity and a common deliberative forum. Citizens must consider that they belong, together with people coming from different member states, to the same political community.

They must feel that the system itself is legitimate because it is one with which they can engage and one which broadly reflects their identity and values. It is this absence of a European community of citizens linked to each other by strong democratic bonds and a sense of common control that sustains the principle problem of democratization within the EU [Warleigh 2003: 109-110].

From the beginning, European integration was driven along a neo-functionalist strategy, aiming at promoting solidarity among Europeans by encouraging a sense of shared identities that would gradually render commitments to nation-states less exclusive and less antagonistic.

This ideology saw the creation of interdependence and cooperation on certain functional matters as the means to forge solidarity. Thus, the European Coal and Steel Community was established in 1951 to render the industrial affairs of the major continental powers so interdependent as to “make war not only unthinkable but materially impossible” [Schuman Declaration] and subsequently further economic integration took place in stages. From the beginning it was expected that these common identities would, to begin with, be shared only by bureaucrats and professionals who took direct part in and were committed to cooperative functional projects. But all along, the hope was that, with time, a sense for shared identities would “spill over” from the top down into ever wider parts of society (Haas 1964).

It must be acknowledged that these hopes have materialized to a significant extent. The statistics (cited in the previous chapter) show that a large number of European citizens have sense of belonging to a community that transcends local and national boundaries, and encompasses diverse peoples. The community of Europeans has come a long way in little more than half a century. Surely the ap-
preciation of peaceful cohabitation, mutual interests, opportunities and increased prosperity encourage such feeling of belongingness. But the question remains whether these factors will prove sufficient for future developments.

Generations of Europeans have never experienced the devastation and fear of war, taking peace for granted. Moreover, the global economic crisis has created a divide between richer and poorer parts of the continent, which in turn engenders distrust for the whole politico-economic system [PRC 2013]. Yet, the remedies to this illness, will predictably involve still further political integration, which requires an enforced sense of solidarity.

2.3 The public sphere: Creating a Space for Dialogue

To this effect, the influential philosopher, Jürgen Habermas, has maintained that the “real prerequisites” for European integration have hitherto not been put to work. A European democracy will not and cannot materialize unless “a European-wide integrated public sphere develops under the ambit of a common political culture” [Habermas 1998]. A public sphere is a concept which describes a realm in which individuals gather as equals to participate in open discussion. Potentially everyone has access to it and no one has a prefigured advantage over anyone else in a rational discourse. It is an ideal of reason and objectivity, of the optimal arena for exchange of views for reaching a fair democratic conclusion. Habermas may pose extremely high criteria of objectivity and his conception of the rational subject's capacity of critique may be contestable. But that need not concern us. His core idea is of great importance and promise. The primary question should concern how one approaches such an ideal strategically with a vision to the future.

The idea of the public sphere is of great significance for European integration, because it provides the framework for active participation in collective choice, in the basic political structure or in particular policy matters. As pointed out earlier, engagement with fellow Europeans is a major factor in the development of a person's sense of European identity. And since the core idea behind the public sphere is precisely to bring individuals together in a fair dialogue, the challenge of developing a real and effective European public sphere therefore represents a feasible means of corroborating European integration and cooperation for the future. It is essentially a medium of integration and solidarity.

The EU has hitherto failed to create the conditions that allow Europeans to engage with one another and the Union itself in significant ways. There has certainly been extensive cooperation and professional exchange between the member states, notably in the fields of science and higher education, through which ideas are shared and cultural bonds are formed. But the primary beneficiaries of such projects are typically the small elite of highly educated professionals and officials. The average citizens will benefit indirectly, certainly, but it is unlikely that such indirect benefits are felt and appreciated.
The rhetoric of necessity vs. democratic choice

The focus and driving force of the EU project has always been the economy. It was the professed intention of the founders to forge such economical links between the major European powers that a war would be unthinkable. Subsequent developments have focused on improving economic competitiveness and growth. Successive steps have been taken in response to economic needs and have been justified as such. This process and discourse through which it is vindicated has been described as the “rhetoric of necessity” [Habermas 1998], where progress and direction are determined by (perceived) necessity rather than choice. Policies are not shaped by the choice of European citizens but by the dictates of (allegedly) unavoidable economic forces, as if on a course of inevitability. The current economic crisis in Europe, is simply an extreme manifestation of this principle. But apart from cases of emergency, “citizens do not seem to be interested in the economy in so far as it does not capture their hearts and souls. It is a mere instrument,” as Ms Tivéus, Director of the European Commission’s Directorate for Citizens, points out. Thus, it is fair to conclude that the “rhetoric of necessity” allows for no choice of destiny nor of destination.

Vibrant communications in an arena such as the public sphere can, in theory, offer the all-important conditions for collective choice. It is a means, perhaps the only means, through which the institutions that drive Europe’s progress into the future may achieve real democratic legitimation. It is a space in which identity is shaped and contested, as individuals can define and redefine their interests and understanding of the common good and personal identity, through participation in public communications.

The brand can be seen as a gateway into a community of likeminded individuals. Apple, for example, has acquired connotations so that using Apple gadgets indicates something beyond their utility function. It may be revealing to explore this notion (of a public sphere which shapes political products and supports a sense of identity) through an analogy with brand fidelity. Consumer brands are often described as symbols through which consumers assume a certain identity. They express certain values or aspirations by wearing or using specific brands. The brand can be seen as a gateway into a community of likeminded individuals. Apple, for example, has acquired connotations so that using Apple gadgets indicates something beyond their utility function. It is, for many, a lifestyle [Arvidsson 2006]. Such an image is largely held up by faithful and enthusiastic users, who are typically critical and demanding. Through modern media; social media in particular, they can form communities where products and services are discussed. Such communities have power and influence that producers cannot disregard. They are a source of creative information. Sometimes users may even develop the products on their own far beyond what the producer intended [Kornberger 2010]. On the other hand, one might object to an analogy between democratic ideals and consumer culture. The point however is that identification is facilitated by active participation and a sense of empowerment. The contemporary media environment does offer great potential in this regard.

The ideals of a Europe-wide public sphere are very big ideas indeed, but there are many obstacles to their realization. Questions concerning how a European public sphere could be constructed, activated and institutionalized need to be addressed. What should be the scope and extent of authoritative public choice? What role should be played by interest groups, civic organizations and political parties (to name but a few)? How is it to be mediated? And, indeed, is it even feasible to construct a public sphere for political discourse, where there are many publics divided by different languages? The following section will try to address the issues mentioned above.
2.4 The limits of the public sphere: Can European media form a European public sphere?

The media in Europe are predominantly national and distribute mainly national stories. However, there is a growing number of magazines, newspapers, websites etc. that do have a Europe-wide readership and report on European matters, even reprinting translated material from media in other European countries. This applies in particular to business publications. Again, the European message is mostly confined to a relatively small group of people. The average person does not consume international media on a systematic basis but instead reads national newspapers with national stories. And to the extent that there is a convergence in European popular culture, it is to a large degree influenced by American cultural industries [Fligstein 2008].

The Brussels establishment is in fact keen on encouraging a wider participation in and awareness of EU affairs among European citizens, but at the same time quite conscious of the obstacles towards the formation of a Europe-wide public sphere. Ms Ylva Tivéus, Director of the European Commission’s Directorate for Citizens, confirms that the European Commission recognizes how the composition of Europe out of separate nations “unified in their diversity”, presents a daunting task for those willing to institutionalize an active and robust trans-European civic society. The media landscape is mostly fragmented, she explains, and its focus rather introspective.

The inevitable consequence is that among the general public there is insufficient awareness of European affairs and, unfortunately, not enough understanding of how the EU institutions should seek to shape and implement public policy, precisely in accordance with the fundamental principles and ideals that European citizens are, for the most part, committed to. Many scholars agree that the EU and its operations are unsurprisingly misunderstood. But then, they often trace this problem back to the alleged lack of transparency in EU procedures and the perceived lack of democratic accountability [Fligstein 2008 p. 125, with references].

In this regard, moreover, domestic political practices in separated member states bear an important responsibility. In national politics, European affairs are all too often regarded as foreign affairs. They are effectively pushed aside, as it were, and kept outside central political debate. One reason for this indifference may be that the questions of European integration do not divide the electorate ideologically along traditional left/right lines.

“The basic raison d’être of European integration is being squeezed. First of all by fear of what the future might bring and, secondly, by petty nationalism. A reversal of this will only be possibly through strong political leadership. But when I look around it is not abundant today.”

Mr Uffe Elleman Jensen, former foreign minister of Denmark.

And among the political elites, the European project has been a matter of broad consensus between the large mainstream political parties both to the left and the right of the political spectrum. Thus, there has been little political motivation for highlighting EU affairs and making them the subject of mainstream political debate. There has not been great disagreement on the direction of the European project between the broadly liberal political parties to the left and right of the centre. Nor have European affairs been a likely vote decider. Consequently, issues that pertain to the future and development of the EU, are somewhat marginalized in domestic politics.

This, however, changes very swiftly in times of crises, when the public is bombarded with negative media coverage related to the European Union – as has been the case for the last four years or so.

As a result, instead of participating in a constructive and sustained dialogue over European affairs and especially on how European issues affect citizens in separate member states, it is all too often left to a minority of interested observers.
rate member-states, the public is periodically made to experience the EU as an entity, that is by political practices defined as external (or at least extra-domestic), which imposes inconvenience and requires sacrifices.

Therefore, in the current economic and political climate, the ground is fertile for Eurosceptic (and all sorts of populist) arguments. And since European affairs have been marginalized in domestic discourses, both the mainstream political movements and the general public are ill prepared to engage in the debate. The arguments for European integration have not developed through public reason but rather remain technocratic. The issues have not acquired the status of direct relevance among the public, but are rather seen as ‘other peoples’ problems.” It is thus all too easy for the Eurosceptics to take the initiative and lead the debate.

The rise of Euroscepticism should be of great concern to those who believe in the European project, according to Mr Uffe Elleman Jensen, former foreign minister of Denmark: “I see it as a sign that support for the basic raison d’être of European integration is being squeezed. First of all by fear of what the future might bring and, secondly, by petty nationalism. A reversal of this will only be possibly through strong political leadership. But when I look around it is not abundant today.”

2.5 Europeanisation of public spheres

If this description is on the right lines, then perhaps the most pertinent advice to those who want to construct a European public sphere, is to look not so much toward institutional changes imposed from above, but rather to progress bottom-up and start by addressing the issue of how European affairs are handled on the domestic front. To adopt this line of argument is not to give up on the idea that, in time, a proper Europe wide public sphere will evolve, in which the future and purpose of the European project will be debated and decided upon through democratic processes.

It is rather a realistic approach to the issue, acknowledging the various structural, political and cultural obstacles that remain in the way of a robust Europe-wide democratic polity. Perhaps it may be regarded as a rapprochement of the idea of decentralization (referred to above) and that of a fully-fledged European public sphere—an indication of a strategic vision that combines positive aspects of competing strategies.

As noted throughout this policy briefing, there are various reasons to be skeptical about the existence of a European demos in a strong sense. That is to say, a political community characterized by loyalty and cohesion to the degree that its members are willing to share the benefits and burdens of social life, including redistribution of resources; typical of the modern welfare-state. The EU has by contrast been described as a “government of governments” rather than a government of citizens [Scharpf 2009]. Attempting to artificially construct such a community would almost certainly prove counterproductive, so long as it is not consistent with the sense of community among European citizens.

“We are probably not ready for dramatic institutional changes in this regard. The current economic problems are testing the perseverance of both citizens and politicians. But we do have the wherewithal to address these and other pressing problems within the existing legal framework. Dramatic changes would surely just rock the boat. Yes, we want democracy and we do have democracy, even if it’s not perfect. And we must develop it in reasonable steps.”

Mr Urmas Paet, Foreign Minister of Estonia

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Public spheres and domestic politics

But focusing on the awareness problems on the separate domestic fronts and seeking ways to “de-marginalize” European affairs in national politics, is to engage with the issue right where the battle for the hearts and minds of Europeans is taking place – in the various public spheres of domestic politics.

This reasoning is supported by a recent study, conducted by Thomas Risse [Risse 2010], who argues that while a robust European civil society capable of sustaining a democratic polity may not yet be a reality, it is gradually emerging through various European public spheres. According to his argument, national public spheres have become ever more Europeanised (in vastly different degrees) in recent years, though this Europeanisation is still to a large extent confined to political elites.

The economic and political integration that has taken place in forgoing recent decades has made Europe a real and constant presence in European capitals, for civil service, business and industry. As the separate political systems become Europeanised, they become politicised. But, hitherto, this process of public politicisation has, for the most part, been driven by Euroscepticism in the public spheres.

The European Commission has in fact taken steps in this direction according to Ms Ylva Tivéus: “We have just started to hold old fashioned town hall meetings, where Commissioners meet citizens face to face. They come there primarily to listen and to discuss those matters that the people are concerned with. Such meetings have no formal effect but they are meant to influence policy”. The Commission is making an effort at reaching out to the public. But, as Ms Tivéus points out, this is not quite where actual politics take place. It is the responsibility of national politicians to take these debates further within their own public spheres and make sure that the voice of the people finds resonance in their governments.

This seems to be the most promising approach toward building a Europe-wide public sphere at this moment in time. It places great responsibility on the shoulders of those who want to see this project progress, not to shy away from the issues, even if that may be politically uncomfortable at times. It may be regarded as an effort to domesticate Europe, rather than Europeanise willy-nilly citizens. With greater presence and sustained discussion about the EU in respective public spheres, the psychological existence of Europe becomes more salient. This should, in turn, make it more natural to identify with the European project and develop a real sense of community.

So, to conclude and answer questions raised at the beginning of this section, a European public sphere does exist, albeit in an embryonic and fragmented form. These distinct but interconnected public spheres need to be nurtured and kept active. And as to the pertinent scope of these distinct civil spaces (or the appropriate questions to be raised and concluded within their bounds) the issues to be debated should be European issues in domestic context or domestic issues put into a wider European perspective. That is to say, citizens in separate EU countries should be encouraged to en-
gage in a debate about EU policies, in order to understand how they affect their interests and their societies. They should discuss how they want to see the Union develop and how that would affect their communities.

For, only by commencing this debate in earnest, will the real salience and centrality of EU policies in European societies be given its due concern.

But hitherto, these issues have, to a large extent, been silenced. The mainstream political elites in different member-states must be prepared to make an effort to normalise constructive debate about what the EU should be like (as opposed to mere arguments about whether or not it should be supported). It may be plausible that eventually a stronger democratic legitimacy will be required to sustain the integration process. But it is hardly reasonable to demand radical institutional changes until we have learned to master those that are at hand. To conclude, it is imperative for the EU to adopt a strategic vision that is at once realistic and progressive.
3. Europeanisation and globalisation: the international dimension

The European Union derives a considerable part of its identity from its actions and representation in the world. The very concept of identity is relational. It consists in comparisons with and distinction from “the other.” Therefore it is not enough to explore the EU’s internal arrangements or to establish its physical boundaries. It is, partly, by stating its place on the international stage that Europe establishes its identity. At the same time, an image in the global context is of significance not only for vis-à-vis foreign powers, but for the citizens of Europe as well.

Nowadays, most aspects of modern life are becoming ever more globalised. Events in distant parts of the world have effects that cannot be ignored. Economies are interconnected and humanitarian ideals require a response to faraway crisis. The European Union is a major force on the world scene. But global power relations are shifting, both in terms of economic clout and military might. New powers are rising in Asia and in South America. At the same time, the influence of individual European states, one time empires and colonial powers, diminishes. “European influence is dwindling, both because of Europe’s own persistent problems, but also as a result of the relative decline of the West,” observes Mr Uffe Elleman-Jensen.

The fast pace of globalisation presents the most pressing challenge to Europe. It may even be debated whether Europeanisation is anything other than a provincial perspective on a larger global trend, whether Europeanisation is can be reduced to Globalisation [European Commission 2012, 8]. Not merely does it raise the important questions of a common foreign policy and a common defense policy, it forces the EU to confront the very issue of its telos, or goal, and thus its identity.

3.1 A common European Foreign Policy

The willingness of EU member-states to form a strong front on the international stage may be traced back to 1970, when a process called the European Political Co-operation was launched. This cooperation on international affairs was finally developed into the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) adopted with the Maastricht Treaty in 1993.
The preamble to that treaty refers to the intention of “reinforcing the European identity and its independence in order to promote peace, security and progress in Europe and the world (Treaty on European Union 1993, preamble). In this statement, the goal (or legacy) of peace and prosperity in Europe is established, but at the same time Europe is given an important task in world politics. It asserts that Europe stands for important values that will contribute to good world order.

“European influence is dwindling, both because of Europe’s own persistent problems, but also as a result of the relative decline of the West.”
Mr Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Denmark

3.2 Competitiveness and economies of scale
The question of competitiveness in the global order is of course central to the European project as a whole. Europe must strive to realise economic growth in order to be able to offer the best standards of living. It must compete for talent in the global market place if it is going to maintain an edge in business, science and innovation.

This means that it must do far more than attract talented and creative people from other parts of the world. It must also make sure that it provides the opportunities and quality of life to attract and hold on to its homegrown talent (perhaps after gaining valuable experiences abroad).

Europe must look after its own interests if it is to maintain its status in the world. For international politics, everything is about power and influence. Composed of former colonial empires, Europe, has for centuries been a power house in international affairs. Or, rather, European nations have separately been key players and competitors in world politics. Today, the competition comes from outside the continent and it is growing.

However, control over external affairs is central to the very idea of statehood and has always been enviously regarded as a strict prerogative of national executives. Questions of shared decision making power and common representation become pressing. This is one of the major remaining issue areas in European affairs where decisions are still made solely through intergovernmental consensus by national representatives with a clear mandate.

It is therefore positive that support for the common foreign policy and understanding of its rationale is quite high. An overwhelming majority of Europeans also express support for a common EU defense and security policy and common EU foreign policy (73% and 64% respectively). Furthermore, two thirds of Europeans believe that their country cannot cope alone with the negative effects of globalisation and are convinced of the need for international cooperation, within the EU [Eurobarometer 78]. To that extent there is a definite sense of shared interests among European citizens. It has always been the idea behind European cooperation to pool sovereignty in order to gain competitive edge and this factor is clearly an important one, for support for the EU.

And the worries expressed by Europeans are well founded. The dominance, which Europe and the US have had over international trade, has been compromised.

For example, in October 2010 EU member states yielded to the combined pressure of the US and the BRICs (Brazil, Russia, India and China) to cede seats and votes in the International Monetary Fund to rising economic powers. On the other hand, through the EU, member-states have added influence. The EU has forged strong relations with a great number of multilateral organizations and is a major party to hundreds of international agreements. Its status and influence in international fora, varies from being a full member or contracting party to virtual memberships as “enhanced” observer (i.e. fully functional participant but with no voting right), to being a mere observer [CEPS 2011].

For instance, at the UN climate change convention, the EU has full member status like all the EU member-states. They have been criticized, however, for failing to speak in concert and for consequent loss of effectiveness [CEPS 2011]. The relative role of the EU and its member-states, thus, poses challenging questions about state sovereignty and representation on the international stage. A unified front is more powerful, but how willing are individual EU member-states to abandon their autonomous vote?
Some of these questions, moreover, will only be resolved through negotiations with other international players. To what extent can the EU, as a separate entity, have an active status alongside its member states?

In any case, with the Lisbon Treaty, the Union was granted a status of legal personality of its own and the office of High Representative (originally titled Foreign Minister) was established. Many suggest that these measures have provided a “golden opportunity to review the existing arrangements for the representation of the EU in the international system” [CEPS 2011]. Such considerations are too big to be dealt with here.

Suffice to say, that there is a near universal agreement that a unified European front on the world stage will enhance European influence and strengthen the European identity, both as it is felt by Europeans and as well as it is perceived from outside.

3.3 European values and world affairs

The European Union has, in recent years, taken important initiatives on the world stage, notably with regard to efforts to reduce the effects of climate change. It plays an important role in peace negotiations, for example in the Middle East and is the world’s largest development aid donor. The European Union is, in many respects, an exemplar to others, living up to and promoting its core moral values.

The European Union is commonly characterized as a civilian power, operating through trade, aid and technical assistance. It has established a reputation for genuine concern for political stability, the promotion of human rights, welfare, sustainability and international cooperation in other regions. In comparison with other influential players on the international stage, such as the United States or China, the EU only employs soft diplomacy as opposed to hard power backed by military might.

In declaring its strategic vision in security affairs, the EU opens with a celebration of its founding principle of maintaining peace in Europe and how this principle requires of its members that they be “committed to dealing peacefully with disputes and to co-operate through common institutions” [European Council 2003]. It then sets out a vision of a “world order based on effective multilateralism” [European Council 2003]. The EU actively seeks to project an image of a modern and enlightened agent that applies persuasion rather than forcing its neighbors to promote peace and prosperity worldwide. The ideological pillars of the European foreign policy are the rule of international law, multilateral and peaceful conflict resolution, fairness, human rights and democracy.

This is not the place to measure the extent to which the EU lives up to its statements and high ideals. But its leadership on issues such as its position on climate change, the battle against world poverty among others, have been notable in recent years.

What is clear is that the European Union seeks to project an outward-looking version of the conception of a common identity, based on certain core European values, which it promotes among its own citizens. What makes it a credible projection is the very history and combination of the EU itself.

The European Union consists of 28 member states, each with its own history, language and culture, that have for centuries experienced unrelenting warfare in pursuit of narrow self-interest. But these nations have overcome conflict and committed themselves to peaceful multilateral cooperation through commerce and cultural exchange. The European Union is, in this way, a paragon of its own ideals. By playing this role, it has made a product out of its virtues and offers it on the international marketplace to be adopted and emulated.
“We can show that peoples who used to be in constant war with each other have managed to come together and live together peacefully and prosperously. The EU is an example to others in this regard – an incontestable success. And this, along with our values and liberties, is no miserly contribution to international relations.”

Mr Urmas Paet, Foreign Minister of Estonia

Arguably, recourse to soft power may be a direct result of dwindling ability to exert power. But one might also suggest that it is a natural consequence of the EU’s unique composition out of 28 diverse nation states. The principles of civility, compromise and diplomacy are forced upon separate European states, and find expression in their joint actions internationally. Globalisation is therefore not merely a challenge to be met, it also presents an opportunity for constructing, reaffirming and asserting the European identity.

In the international context, European values, and the brand that represents them, are seen in sharp relief. The high public support for the EU’s common foreign and defense policies is very positive in this regard.

The place that the European Union has made for itself in the international stage should be a source of pride among Europeans and provide them with a strengthened sense of the purpose of their common venture. One might say that by projecting this modern and enlightened identity, which European institutions seek to promote among its citizens, and by remaining faithful to it in its foreign policy, the EU simultaneously consolidates its internal identity.

International relations give occasion for solidarity around the values on which European cooperation is built. But for this project to be successful certain conditions need to be met.

First, the economic strength of Europe must be secured. This will, in turn require robust endorsement of the integration process among European citizens. Second, the EU must come closer to determining its end goal – its telos – for it to act confidently and consistently among nations, the Union must have a sense of its own direction. Again, as noted above, public involvement is required for determining the destination of the European project, for it is unlikely that it will be validated in perpetuity through a “rhetoric of necessity.” But it was suggested that the natural points of departure for such public engagement are in fact the separate national public spheres. But as discussed already in this policy briefing, European affairs are often marginalized in domestic politics and regarded as foreign affairs. To follow up on this plead, political elites in Europe need to bring EU affairs into their national political discourse.

Similarly, foreign affairs could be discussed from a more European perspective and in light of Europe’s role in world politics. In that context, the concerted interests of European countries and their need to compose a united front are unmistakable. And, since the outward identity, or brand image, that the EU projects in its foreign policy mirrors the enlightened civil conception of European citizens’ identity, there is a certain congruence between two essential criteria for European integration. On the one hand, there is economic necessity, which has motivated the “elite-bureaucracy” to maintain the integration process (to some extent justified by the “rhetoric of necessity”). On the other hand, there is the shared identity which motivates citizens to support and endorse the integration process.

Globalisation lays bare the benefits of a strong and unified Europe; through which the economies of scale are able to have far more influence than the member-states separately. And if a unified Europe assumes the values enshrined in the identity it promotes among its citizens, and if the EU consistently promotes and acts in accordance with those values, it must surely become more natural for European citizens to identify with the European project.
4. Recommendations

The most urgent task for European leaders today is to regain economic stability and growth. It is a daunting task and is very likely to entail increased political and fiscal integration. For this to be feasible it is important that the European public support such measures and its support, in turn, requires a real attachment to the European project and some sense of shared identity.

Therefore, from the discussion above some preliminary recommendations may be drawn.

1. It has been shown that exposure to other European cultures and engagement with nationals from other EU countries fosters a sense of a shared identity among them, therefore such cross-border communications should be encouraged. This has been done with student exchange programmes such as the ERASMUS and through other transnational networks of professional collaborations. But since the members of the less mobile social classes are more likely to identify exclusively with their home nation, and since the pivotal point is secondary-identification with Europe (“European identity light”), it is imperative to explore how to promote mobility for those citizens, who do not have exposure to Europe.

2. Pro-EU elites should be encouraged to shoulder the responsibility for making European affairs more prominent in the national politics of their respective countries. If there is a lack of democratic accountability then the public must be allowed and accustomed to debate EU policies. Such a debate must be brought to the public where the public is prepared, and presently, this can only take place effectively on the national fronts. Silencing the debate about where Europe is heading can only play into the hands of the sceptics. So European peoples should be allowed, in their respective public spheres, to make up their minds about how they envision Europe. This, in effect, is one way of bringing about exposure to Europe.

3. European leaders should head their citizens’ support for a common EU foreign policy. They should seek to speak with one voice as far as possible. Not just for the sake of economies of scale, or for being heard in international fora to promote European interests (though this is of course the primary purpose of a common foreign policy), but also in order to manifest to European citizens that European identity is being acted out in the ongoing drama of world affairs. This identity does indeed belong to an entity that is an actor of its own, albeit of a very particular kind, namely one that is united in diversity.
5. Conclusion

In the foregoing, we have seen that a sense of common European identity is quite widely shared among European citizens. This identification is stronger among certain social groups, namely those who are highly educated and possess marketable and mobile skills – the so called “Eurostars”, who are able to make the most out of the opportunities provided by a common market. It is clear as well that the engagement with fellow Europeans does foster a feeling of European belonging. This shared identity is actively promoted by EU institutions. It revolves around the core ideals of liberty, equal rights, democracy and the rule of law, in addition to free market liberalism combined with concern for social welfare.

These values have deep roots in European culture and philosophy. Yet, identities are not static. They are contested and fought over. Thus an alternative, conservative and exclusionist conception has gained following and is especially widespread among those who are susceptible to the Eurosceptic rhetoric, although it is not confined to those who are anti-EU. However, the modern and secular conception, which celebrates inclusiveness, multiculturalism and enlightenment values remains predominant.

Furthermore, the formation of transnational identity does not contradict a strong attachment to one’s nation state or local community. Rather, social identities in general and, more importantly, political identities, can and do mix in various ways and may be complementary to one another. Respect for diversity is, indeed, a fundamental principle of the European project.

The second part of this paper raised the issue of a growing unease about the lack of democratic legitimacy in EU governance – the democratic deficit. The process of European integration has hitherto mainly had a technocratic and economical focus. It has been driven by a “rhetoric of necessity” rather than choice of destiny. The neo-functionalist logic, premised on the idea that those who are directly involved in technologies of cooperation will gradually assume a corresponding identity that will in time spill over into the wider community, has indeed proven effective. But it seems to have reached its lim-
its. The European project has mainly not been developed through public will formation.

Therefore, a sense of direction or goal has not developed, at least not among the citizens of Europe. And yet, the very conception of European identity promoted by the institutions involves the central notion of respect for the citizens’ self-determination, inclusion and participation. Thus its internal logic cultivates, as it were, a desire for a robust and effective democratic culture. In order to make the Brand Europe appealing to the “consumer”, they must be involved in its definition in some way or another.

The notion of a European public sphere, where citizens engage in reasoned debate about policies and make decisions about their common destiny is an attractive thought, which seems promising with regard to long term development of democratic practices. However, we have seen that there are many reasons to doubt that Europe is prepared for such a communicative space at this point in time. The continent is divided by languages and the mainstream media are predominantly focused on domestic issues. It is hard to see how a proper European demos and a European civil society are capable of maintaining a robust democratic political culture, which can become a reality while these, and other obstacles, are present. As a result, it is doubtful that these obstacles can be easily removed. But it is not advisable to attempt to impose such a democratic structure upon European peoples by fiat – especially in times when the seeds of scepticism and resistance are sprouting. However, a European demos may be emerging in a fragmented form.

The separate European public spheres have become ever more Europeanized, just like the neo-constructivist logic predicted. Now it is time to politicize European affairs on the home front, where the force of Euro-scepticism is gaining momentum. Domestic politics have tended to marginalize European affairs, but Europe has become a presence that permeates member-states’ societies. It is now time for those who are committed to the European cause to domesticate European affairs (or Europeanize national politics). The European public sphere should be built bottom up. Local populations should be encouraged to view their immediate interests in a wider perspective, inclusive of considerations of how they affect their fellow European citizens. Only then can the emerging European civil society be prepared for making decisions of the future of their joint journey.

Lastly, the third part of this policy briefing explored how the European identity is reflected in the EU’s external relations. The global context reveals how important it is to maintain a strong and united front, politically and economically, in face of growing international competition. It reintroduces the rhetoric of necessity, as it were. Questions remain unanswered, as to how European nations should be represented in international fora to make the most of the economies of scale, and thereby promote European interests.

But significantly, it transpires that there is a continuation or congruence between the image projected in EU foreign affairs and the common identity that has been forming among European peoples.

On the international stage, Europe represents the ideals of the rule of international law, multilateral conflict resolution, protection of human rights and democracy. Most importantly, though, Europe’s claim to these ideal is credible in light of the successful history of European integration, which has brought different nations together in pursuit of common advantage and prosperity, in accordance with civil principles and mutual respect. In this sense, Europe itself is paradigmatic of the values and practices it promotes in international relations. Europe has a strong and authentic identity on the global stage.

Europe has, indeed, made an export product of its core values and confidently contributes it to the construction of a civil world order. This is a matter which European citizens can take pride in and identify with. And the unequivocal support for EU foreign policy among European citizens is perhaps the strongest indication that the EU is slowly moving in the right direction, both home and abroad.
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Julian Hoerner is a Research Fellow at Gold Mercury International and a PhD candidate at the European Institute, which is part of the London School of Economics and Political Science ‘LSE’. In the past, he has completed a BA in European Studies at Maastricht University, followed by an MSc at the LSE. He has authored a number of papers on European policy making.

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“The EU urgently needs a shared understanding of how to realise its ambitious agenda. It needs to identify the measures required to adapt to the global era, and the costs and implications of standing still. In short, it needs to communicate a common vision of how Europe can secure its future. The choice we face is therefore clear: build on the strengths of the EU and use its collective weight to become an assertive and relevant player in the world, or cultivate fragmentation and contemplate the possibility of absolute decline in a world where the rules are defined by those who matter.


The European Union (EU) is a major political and economic union of 28 nation states.